Crisis Caravan
04/08/2019
In what kinds of humanitarian responses can aid be apolitical?
I feel as though this question could be answered from a number of different perspectives. Do they mean to ask if the idea of providing aid initially comes from a political perspective? Or are they asking which specific types of aid are apolitical? Perhaps they mean to ask which avenue of executing aid provision is such? These are all different levels of response, and I think that the degree of political motivation is different in each. While I consider aid to undeniably be “force multipliers” in war strategy, I don’t think they are always born with the intent to be such. Especially those organizations which have survived through the decades, I believe to be operating in the true spirit of humanitarianism. I think that when most organizations decide to respond to a crisis, it is most often because they genuinely believe it to be in the best interest for that community. There are certainly groups that choose to respond with less admirable intentions, but I would not consider that sector to be the majority. If the question is instead which types of aid are apolitical, the answer becomes less obvious. As defined by the UN general assembly in 1991, there are four basic principles that govern humanitarian aid: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Although a commonly vocalized value, neutrality is an idea I have found to be extremely difficult to execute. Humanitarian aid is meant to mean healing the sick and feeding the hungry. Unfortunately, even actions with such seemingly pure intentions must somehow be funded, and when money becomes involved nothing is truly innocent. Humanitarian aid is becoming an integral part of donors’ comprehensive strategy to transform conflicts, decrease violence and set the stage for liberal development. The money is provided in those areas which donors want to see improvement, not necessarily an umbrella of assistance covering the entire situation. I think that there are still some types of aid such as cash transfers that provide help without accompanying restrictions, but when physical materials are provided, it is not always what is needed, who needs it, or where it’s needed. This leads into my last question of which avenues of execution are political or otherwise. Again, with the example of cash transfers, it is significantly more difficult for the money to fall into the wrong hands. When organizations have a physical presence, they become much easier targets. Sometimes a physical presence is necessary, while they may not be placed with political intent, a political response should be expected. “NGOs operating in a purely modernist paradigm continue to be at risk of being perceived as the soft power arm of the occupying civilization and will remain at risk of being targeted.” Beyond this, it is also often common that the option for governments to withhold aid, or to refuse the acceptance of offered aid, both political moves which drastically impact what is provided to a community in need. A current example of this is the political crisis in Venezuela, where aid has been stopped at the border by the Venezuelan president. An article and video detailing this standoff are attached below.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-un/un-warns-against-politicizing-humanitarian-aid-in-venezuela-idUSKCN1PV2GF
How does the phrase ‘hearts and minds’ figure into your answer?
The idea of “winning the hearts and minds” is contradictory in nature. This term should mean that something was done so well that the other party is on board beyond physically, but emotionally. Yet in the context of the book, Polman describes how aid is exploited to “win hearts”. While she describes the strategization of aid provision with a negative connotation, I think she is doing so by looking only through the lens that political motivations are bad for the nature of aid. If we assume that the reach of aid is bounded strictly by the four guiding principle mentioned above then this is probably true. But I think there is potential for these strategies, and so thusly they should not so quickly be disregarded. One of the core themes for our class has been the idea that often aid hurts instead of helps. It seems that while we may perceive the need for assistance in a community, we struggle to provide it in a way that best suits their culture. It makes sense to me that foreign involvement (especially in home-born situations) should be expected to cause some issues no matter how good of intentions are held. So, or class has debated throughout the semester how to adapt aid to better fit in such situations. I think it would be tremendously beneficial to not only work on adjusting the avenues of provision but also those of aid acceptance. Instead of trying to force foreign assistance down the throats of others, would it not be better to first win their hearts and minds and build some sort of foundation on trust. Obviously, this is no solution to the many issues involved in humanitarianism, and if we are to accept this way of doing things, we can similarly expect the abuse mentioned by Polman to also increase. But I think that the phrase of winning hearts and minds can be just as positive as negative and shouldn’t be completely run-over.
In reference to the question above, is it fair to look back at the founding of the Peace Corps by the Kennedy administration as a ‘force multiplier’ in the Cold War?
What about US foreign ‘aid’ in general?
In consideration to the founding of Peace Corps, I wouldn’t consider it as an organization born to be a force multiplier. Instead it seems to me, the Kennedy used Peace Corps as a means to persuade the people of America in his favor- “win hearts and minds” if you will. I’m basing my answer on the timing of Peace Corps foundation, and how it was introduced in his speeches. It seems to me that Kennedy recognized the American appeal to aid and used this to gain emotional advantage. In terms of US foriegn aid in general, I think that it quickly became recognized as a means of war strategy an would agree that there is often political motive behind what the government agrees to do. Peace Corps while not created to be a force multiplier, certainly was one, and for that reason probably changed how the US decided to utilize aid.
In reference to the two questions above, can ‘charity’ or aid/development efforts in our local community here in Alamance County and/or more generally domestically be seen as political actions/force multipliers?
I think it’s much harder to judge intentions on such a small level. While it is possible, I think it unlikely that local charity would have much political motivation.
Video: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/venezuela-crisis-us-humanitarian-aid-nicolas-maduro-standoff-juan-guaido/
“Climate Change and Human Rights.” Global Policy Journal, www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/16/02/2015/why-are-humanitarian-workers-targeted.
Nichols, Michelle. “U.N. Warns against Politicizing Humanitarian Aid in Venezuela.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 6 Feb. 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-un/un-warns-against-politicizing-humanitarian-aid-in-venezuela-idUSKCN1PV2GF.
“Peace Corps Established.” History.com, A&E Television Networks, 21 July 2010, www.history.com/this-day-in-history/peace-corps-established.
Rysaback-Smith, Heather. “History and Principles of Humanitarian Action.” Turkish Journal of Emergency Medicine, Elsevier, 9 Mar. 2016, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4910138/.
UN STAFF. “Deliver Humanitarian Aid.” United Nations, United Nations, 2019, www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/deliver-humanitarian-aid/.