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The Residual Effect of Hard-Line Lobbying
On Radio Martí Content

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This study links exchange theory to framing theory by examining content shifts at Radio Martí, a U.S.-sponsored station that tries to reach people in Cuba the way Radio Free Europe targeted people in Eastern Europe. Although the United States government funds Radio Martí, a group of devout anti-Castro Cuban exiles have been allowed to exercise a substantial amount of control over station operations. The hard-line exiles exercised a considerable amount of influence over the United States' Cuba policy in the 1990s due to a unified organization, the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). After the leader of the group died, the CANF became fragmented and exercised considerably less influence in Washington. Despite the diminished influence, Radio Martí's content used more anti-Castro frames due to the lobbying that the CANF had executed in previous years. Many of the officials that had been lobbied chaired key committees related to Radio Martí and stifled efforts to correct the station's lack of objectivity.

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Introduction

Radio Martí was first proposed in 1981 to deliver the “truth” to Cuba the way Radio Free Europe reached people on the other side of the Iron Curtain. In the 30 years that the station has been on the air, Radio Martí has been controversial in that some of the station’s own employees have said that the broadcasts are not objective. Many have charged Radio Martí with disseminating content that projects the agenda of the hard-line Cuban exile community in south Florida. This paper finds a link between hard-liners’ control of resources relevant to Radio Martí and the station’s content.

Background

During the administration of Jimmy Carter, the governments of Nicaragua and Grenada had fallen under leftist influence. Forces from the left and right launched a civil war in El Salvador for control of the government. Ronald Reagan entered the White House intending to roll back leftist influence in the region. Reagan advocated a hard-line strategy for Cuba, which was the direct opposite of Carter who hoped to normalize relationships between the United States and Cuba. Carter allowed for the two countries to establish Interests Sections, one step below an embassy, in the capital cities of each country. The hard-line strategy advocated by Reagan called for a reversal of this policy and was consistent with what many Cuban exiles had called for since Castro took over in 1959: the continued isolation of Cuba, maintaining the embargo, and confronting Castro on every possible front.

To assist the White House in its objectives, Reagan proposed creating an advocacy group of Cuban Americans that would draw attention to the seriousness of unfriendly governments in the region. The group was

called the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). Although the CANF was created to advance Reagan’s agenda for the entire region, it was foremost an anti-Castro organization. The organization’s membership was loaded with Bay of Pigs veterans who never surrendered their crusade against Fidel Castro. Most anti-Castro Cuban exiles aligned themselves with the Republicans after being betrayed by President Kennedy, who withheld air support for exile forces during the Bay of Pigs invasion. The exiles’ hatred of the Democrats was increased during the Cuban Missile Crisis when Kennedy promised not to invade Cuba. After Kennedy, the U.S. and Cuba settled into détente until Reagan used the rise of leftist influence in the Caribbean to resurrect exile animosity.

Hard-liners in the CANF welcomed the opportunity to oppose Castro in Nicaragua, Grenada and El Salvador. Once the leftist trends in these countries had been reversed, the CANF felt that Cuba would follow. As Jorge Mas Canosa, one of the organization’s leaders said shortly after the group was formed, “We wish to request that you follow Cuban-related events very closely in the immediate future. It is possible that events of great transcendency will come to pass inside Cuba.”¹

Radio Martí was the CANF’s first objective. Named after the Cuban poet Jose Martí, Reagan officials believed that the station could be used as an offensive weapon and would weaken Castro’s prestige in Cuba and throughout the region. CANF leader Jorge Mas Canosa was given a considerable amount of control over operations at Radio Martí.

After helping pass the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act in 1983 and getting Radio Martí on the air in 1985, the CANF began increasing its leverage on Capitol Hill. A 1988 article by Penn State University’s John Spicer

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Nichols, the leading authority on Cuban media, revealed that the CANF had used \$385,400 to lobby members of Congress.² The CANF's goal was clear, use Congress to maintain a hard-line policy against Cuba. As one Foundation member said, "We have changed votes with political contributions."³

The CANF's influence in Washington seemed to be a factor at Radio Martí as communist governments began to fall across Eastern Europe. Radio Martí employees began complaining about excessive CANF influence at the station.⁴ Radio Martí observers noted that Jorge Mas Canosa and the CANF felt that Castro's fall was imminent and used Radio Martí to promote themselves as the leaders of post-Castro Cuba.⁵ The hard-liners had a new constitution for Cuba and had begun selling lots for businesses on the island even though it had not yet gained control.⁶ A common charge was that Mas used Radio Martí to promote himself as the first Cuban president of the post-Castro era. It was also during this time that the CANF increased its lobbying efforts in Congress to ensure that the United States maintained its hard-line policy against Cuba. Lifting the embargo before Castro's downfall would have jeopardized the hard-liners' plans to develop the island.

The obvious illustration that the CANF had influence in Washington was TV Martí, a television version of Radio Martí. Launched in 1990, the station has been effectively jammed by the Cuban government. Unlike radio signals, which have a better chance of evading interference, television signals can be obliterated with minimal effort. As a result, practically no one in Cuba has seen TV Martí, which continues to operate. The United States has spent millions of taxpayer dollars on the station only to appease the hard-line exiles in Florida. To this day, members of Congress who sided with the hard-liners tend to ignore the fact that TV Martí is ineffective.

The hard-line movement lost its leader on November 23, 1997 when Jorge Mas Canosa died. Infighting among CANF leaders

in the months that followed Mas' death caused the organization's influence in Washington to diminish. By 2001, the CANF had clearly taken a more moderate position on Cuba by advocating policies that called for a more conciliatory approach with Cuba. In the summer of 2001, several prominent CANF leaders resigned their positions, citing the organization's support of a moderate approach to Cuban policy.

On the surface, the CANF's demise suggested that Radio Martí's tone would be less hostile. Anyone looking below the surface would have seen otherwise. Although the CANF was less influential, the officials that the organization had courted during its time of influence continued to serve in Congress. Although the CANF had changed, the officials' position on the United States' Cuba policy had not. This allowed the Cuban hard-liners, although not as dominant, to continue to have influence over Radio Martí.

Most important were the officials who had earned chairmanships of the six committees most relevant to operations at Radio Martí. These six committees included the Appropriations and Budget committees in the Senate and House because they allocated funding. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs were relevant to Radio Martí because they covered issues regarding relations with other countries, which included broadcasting to Cuba. By controlling these chairs, the officials had the power to stifle most efforts to limit funding for Radio Martí or force it to take a moderate tone. The author concedes that seats on these committees could also have influenced Radio Martí's content but argues that that influence would have been diminished by the impact that a chair would have had over committee proceedings.

In the 106th Congress (1999-2000), the first complete session in which the CANF did not have substantial influence, officials who clearly advocated a hard-line strategy for Cuba headed each of the six committees. Alaska Senator Ted Stevens chaired the Senate Appropriations Committee. In 2003, he

killed a bill that would have normalized travel to Cuba.⁷ New Mexico Senator Pete Domenici chaired the Senate Budget Committee. He seemed to be a hard-line ally in 2004 when he introduced a bill protecting trademarks confiscated by Cuba.⁸ The bill benefited one company in particular, Bacardi Rum, which lost millions in property and revenue after Castro's takeover in 1959. Bacardi had long advocated hard-line action against Cuba.⁹ Perhaps the most obvious hard-liner in the Senate was North Carolina's Jesse Helms who chaired the Foreign Relations Committee. Helms' stance on Cuba is best illustrated by his support of the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act, which is commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act. The law codified sanctions against Cuba, making it illegal for the two countries to have normal relations.

Hard-line officials also controlled the equivalent influential House committees in the 106th Congress. Florida Representative Bill Young chaired the House Appropriations Committee. He worked with Stevens to kill the 2003 attempt to normalize travel to Cuba.¹⁰ As chair of the House Budget Committee, Ohio Representative John Kasich added a provision to the Helms-Burton Act that made it more punitive.¹¹ In 1999, New York Representative Benjamin Gilman, chair of the House International Relations Committee, co-wrote a hard-line article with Indiana Representative Dan Burton, the second namesake of the Helms-Burton Act. The article charged Fidel Castro with participating in international drug trafficking.¹²

Some officials in Congress opposed a hard-line strategy for Cuba but few of them chaired these six committees in the years immediately following the CANF's demise. The non-hard-line officials who chaired these six committees during this time did not consistently advocate a hard-line strategy for Cuba but were not clearly opposed to a hard-line strategy either. By not opposing such a strategy, the officials would be more likely to accept the status quo.

The hard-liners were more likely to control these committee seats because the Republicans, the party with whom most exiles had affiliated themselves with since the Kennedy administration, controlled both chambers for almost this entire period. The relationship between hard-liners and the Clinton administration was strained, particularly when Clinton adopted the wet foot/dry foot policy in which Cuban refugees picked up at sea would be repatriated to Cuba rather than brought to the United States. George W. Bush reinvigorated hard-line passion by restricting travel to the island and limiting the amount of money exiles could send to relatives living in Cuba. Although these policies were unpopular, including among Cuban exiles, there was little opposition to them in Congress. Lincoln Diaz-Balart had replaced Jorge Mas Canosa as the unofficial leader of the hard-line exile movement and advisor to President Bush.¹³

Diaz-Balart was joined by fellow exile Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Mario Diaz-Balart (his brother) and Senator Mel Martinez, all Republicans from Florida who advocated a hard-line strategy for Cuba. These four individuals exerted enough influence in Congress and the White House to ensure that investigations Radio Martí would not advance. Ros-Lehtinen was an influential member of the House Committee on International Relations. When Arizona Representative Jeff Flake, a Republican moderate on Cuba, and Massachusetts Representative William Delahunt, a Democrat, amended a bill to call for a review of Radio Martí, Ros-Lehtinen acted. Speaking in a hearing of the Committee on International Relations, she threatened to block the larger bill. "If passed, this amendment will mean that this bill will not progress, as the leadership and the White House are committed to blocking any effort to soften U.S. policy toward the regime. The President is personally committed to make both TV and Radio Martí a success."¹⁴ This action demonstrated the influence that hard-line allies had over policy but also implied, by the presence of Flake as a moderate and their

confidence in pushing the issue, that their influence could be waning.

In the 2006 elections, Democrats took control of the House and Senate, forcing the Republicans to relinquish control of these powerful chairs. Shortly after gaining control, the Democrats announced that they would create Investigations and Oversight Subcommittees for several committees. A month after the election, William Delahunt, incoming chair of the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, announced that he would hold hearings on Radio Martí. "There's mismanagement...that really demands a thorough review."¹⁵

The promised hearings did not occur in the 110th session of Congress, possibly to avoid alienating Miami's Cubans before the 2008 presidential election. Still, Delahunt repeated his call for an investigation of the United States' broadcasts to Cuba.¹⁶ It is worth noting that, in August of 2009, 35 jobs were eliminated at the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, the entity that operates Radio Martí and its sister station TV Martí.¹⁷

Literature Review – Exchange Theory

The author believes that there is a connection between power derived from controlling resources and the ability to present a message. George C. Homans (1958) noted that the exchange of resources becomes a means to maximize one's rewards. An actor will seek partners with whom to exchange commodities that will improve his or her status. The resources may be tangible (goods) or intangible (affection). In a complex relationship, the values placed upon the commodities and each party's position in the system determine the amount of power and influence the different players are able to exercise over others. Homans compared the social phenomenon to a pigeon in a controlled environment that has been conditioned to receive food (stimulus) when it "pecks at a target" (p. 598). An increased need will cause the subject to value the desired resource differently. The subject can also become satiated,

at which point the resource is diminished in value.

Emerson (1962), Dwyer, Schurr & Oh (1987; 2001) and Thibaut and Kelley (1959) supported the idea that parties enter relationships for mutual benefits. Emerson (1962) clarified power and dependence:

Power (Pab): The power of actor A over actor B is the amount of resistance on the part of B which can be potentially overcome by A.

Dependence (Dab): The dependence of actor A upon B is (1) directly proportional to A's *motivational investment* in goals mediated by B, and (2) inversely proportional to the *availability* of those goals to A outside of the A-B relation (Emerson, 1962, p. 32).

When party B wants or needs a resource controlled by party A, the power that party A has over party B increases. At the same time, the dependence that party B has upon party A increases in a proportional ratio. This is expressed in the equation:

$$P_{ab} = D_{ba}$$

$$P_{ba} = D_{ab} \text{ (Emerson, 1962, p. 33).}$$

Blau (1964) added to this with his definition of power:

[T]he ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence either in the form of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punishment, inasmuch as the former as well as the latter constitute, in effect, a negative sanction" (p. 117).

Bacharach and Lawler (1976) and Molm (1981a, 1981b) argued that the exchange

plays out like a game in which the possibility that a resource could be withheld or used in a way that hurts the other party is enough to influence the weaker party's actions. For example, public officials act to appease constituents to prevent the public from activating its resource, votes. Although this may not occur, the possibility that it could occur is enough to influence the official.

Emerson (1962) introduced the concept of four "balancing operations" as a way for disadvantaged actors to re-evaluate the relationship: withdrawal, alternate source, elevation of status for the other party, and formation of a coalition. The balancing operations come into play when the dominant party exercises its power advantage. Once implemented, the resource is lost (Emerson, 1969). "To have a power advantage is to use it, and to use it is to lose it" (p. 391).

Exchange theory research has been dependent on experiments conducted in laboratory settings (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Stolte, 1988; Markovsky, Willer and Patton, 1988). Although he did not mention exchange theory, Haider-Markel (1999) explored the concepts of exchange theory by examining how political affiliation, member ideology, religious affiliation, and constituent interests influenced politicians' voting records on gay and lesbian issues.

One must consider the fact that relationships are rarely limited to one commodity. Cook (1982) defined this as multiplexity and illustrated the idea with the analogy of a mother and a child. The relationship is strong because the mother provides the child with food, nurturing, and affection. In return, the child reciprocates with affection, sense of purpose, and perspective.

Literature Review—Framing Theory

Framing theory is based on the idea that an individual's environment moves too fast to evaluate all sensory stimuli.¹⁸ As a result, people develop shortcuts or "frames" that allow us to accelerate our ability to interpret.¹⁹ Although framing theory was originally not applied to media environments, the

use of frames as a surveillance function facilitated its application to mass communication theory.

There have been inconsistent definitions of frames.²⁰ These definitions include "a theme,"²¹ "central organizing idea,"²² "the process by which a communications source... constructs,"²³ "persistent patterns,"²⁴ and "'schemata' of interpretation."²⁵ Frames have also been described as experience that facilitate understanding and influence action.²⁶ Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, and Sasson compared framing to schema in cognitive psychology.²⁷ Frames have also been described as providing a connection to familiar ground or labels to complex situations.²⁸

Senders and receivers frame messages. Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, and Sasson said, "Events and experiences are framed; On the other hand, we frame events and experiences."²⁹ Effective framing requires sender and receiver to use congruent frames. Snow et al. called this frame alignment, defined as "the linkage of individual and...interpretive orientations."³⁰ They claimed it to be a factor in a message's ability to convince others to support social movement organizations.

Scheufele stressed a need for increased understanding regarding both media and audience frames and developed a model of the framing process to illustrate the creation and re-creation of both. He identified four sub-processes: frame building, frame setting, the individual-level effects of framing, and the influence framed messages have on journalists as members of an audience. He believed a model was necessary to distinguish "distinct different approaches," all of which seemed to be "framing."³¹

The media play a role in the way audiences interpret events "by framing images of reality."³² Decisions regarding which facts, language and images to use may alter the impression that disseminated information makes on an audience.³³ Gamson and Modigliani listed five different devices the media could use to frame: visual images,

metaphors, catchphrases, depictions, and exemplars.³⁴ Tankard identified 11 framing mechanisms: headlines, subheads, photographs, photo captions, leads, selection of sources, selections of quotes, pull quotes, logos, statistics and charts, and concluding statements and paragraphs.³⁵ Other basic elements such as word selection, editing and cropping photos are all done at the discretion of an information gatekeeper to arrange information in what is perceived as the best way to present it to an audience. Ignoring a news story is a frame because it implies that the information lacks news value.³⁶

Gamson and Stuart introduced the concept of a “package,” or something with “an internal structure” and “a central organizing idea or frame suggesting what is at issue.”³⁷ The “signature elements” associated with the frame act as “condensing symbols” that become synonymous with corresponding characteristics, which make it easier for media to present information.³⁸ Gitlin also mentioned the use of frames to package information for effective dissemination to audiences.³⁹

Frames often have more impact than the information being framed.⁴⁰ As Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, and Sasson wrote, “Facts, as much as images, take on their meaning by being embedded in some larger system of meaning or frame.”⁴¹ McCombs and Ghanem said that frames cluster around attributes, forming another macro attribute.⁴² Public relations practitioners have influenced the media by packaging information for them.⁴³

News content typically develops frames for events that “fundamentally affect how readers and viewers understand those events and issues.”⁴⁴ Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley found that audiences reacted more positively to news stories about a Ku Klux Klan rally when it was framed as a matter of “free speech” than when the story was framed as a matter of “public order.”⁴⁵ The information in the two types of stories was very similar. Only the frame, and the audience reaction, had changed.

News packages often use what Iyengar called “episodic frames,” which are essentially fact-based presentations “in terms of concrete instances,” or “thematic frames,” which offer more information and context for understanding.⁴⁶ Iyengar added that news media could employ both types of frames in the same story, although episodic frames are more frequent. Bennett (2007) believed that news capitalizes on the dramatic rather than pertinent elements of an issue.⁴⁷ Neuman, Just, and Crigler listed five themes the media use as frames: economics, conflict, powerlessness, human interest, and moral values.⁴⁸

This gives a media source a substantial amount of influence. Gamson (1988) claimed that framing’s impact derives from: “access to and control of material resources, strategic alliances, and stock of knowledge and skills in frame sponsorship.”⁴⁹ According to Reese, a party’s ability to frame depends on “access to resources, a store of knowledge and strategic alliances.”⁵⁰ Pan and Kosicki defined resources needed to frame a message as:

“the natural, social, structural, institutional, and cultural means that are available to an actor to promote his or her frame and to influence the language, context, and atmosphere of public deliberation concerning an issue.”⁵¹

This language implies that there is a relationship between control of resources and the ability to frame a message.

Methodology

The author believes that this interpretation by Pan and Kosicki implies a relationship between exchange theory and framing theory. The “means” of which Pan and Kosicki speak could be translated to resources that could be converted to power and influence over frames implemented in media content. The basic hypothesis for this study is that the party that controlled the resources relevant to Radio Martí would be in a

position to exert power over the station's content.

Control of the committee chairs was the independent variable in this study. There were no other significant changes in the United States' policy regarding Cuba or Radio Martí during the time covered in this study. The author believed that this had a causal relationship with Radio Martí's content, the dependent variable.

The station's history suggests two distinct periods for Radio Martí relevant to these questions. Period A began in 1989, the year that the hard-line exiles began to use Radio Martí to promote themselves as the leaders of post-Castro Cuba. Although Period A was the time the hard-liners seemed to have the most power in Washington, it is also the time that Radio Martí was under the most scrutiny. Awareness of the CANF's attempts to use the station may have forced it to disseminate content closer to the center.

Their influence began to decline after the death of Jorge Mas Canosa. Period B began in 1999 because it coincided with the start of the first full session of Congress after Mas' death, providing a clear start time for controlling the chairs. Period B lasted until 2006, the year the hard-liners lost control of the powerful committee seats. From this, the author has developed three research questions:

RQ₁: Did hard-line officials maintain their control of powerful committee chairs relevant to operations at Radio Martí from Period A to Period B?

RQ₂: Did Radio Martí's content change in accord with a shift in power derived from control of these committee chairs?

RQ₃: Is there a relationship between control of these committee chairs relevant to operations at Radio Martí and the intensity of hard-line frames?

To determine if hard-line officials controlled committee chairs, the researcher had

to identify each chair's orientation on Cuba-related legislation in the two periods. All bills, resolutions and amendments submitted to Congress during either period had the potential to be Cuba-relevant. To identify Cuba-relevant legislation, the author used the Library of Congress' online database (available at www.thomas.loc.gov) and entered "Cuba" and "Radio Martí" as terms on the *Search Bills and Resolutions* page. Recognizing that the circumstances surrounding the Elian Gonzalez controversy were so divisive during the 106th session of Congress, "Elian Gonzalez" was included as a search term for that and all subsequent sessions of Congress.

A legislative item was designated pro-hard-line if it augmented sanctions against Cuba, set requirements for normalizing relations or easing sanctions against Cuba (making it more difficult to normalize relations), discouraged engagement with Cuba, specifically challenged Cuban aggression in other countries, advanced broadcasting to Cuba, or antagonized Fidel Castro or the Cuban government. A legislative item was designated as anti-hard-line if it called for easing sanctions against Cuba, encouraged engagement with Cuba, hindered broadcasting to Cuba, or advanced a conciliatory act toward Cuba. A legislative item was excluded from the analysis if it did not deal exclusively with Cuba or did not advocate a definitive pro- or anti-hard-line position.

An official that sponsored, co-sponsored or voted for hard-line legislation was noted as taking a pro-hard-line position. An official that voted against or voted to table an anti-hard-line legislative item was also noted as taking a pro-hard-line position. An official that sponsored, co-sponsored, or voted for anti-hard-line legislation was noted as taking an anti-hard-line position. An official that voted against or voted to table a pro-hard-line legislative item was also noted as taking an anti-hard-line position. Officials that both sponsored and voted on an item were counted as taking a position on the item only once. See Table 1 above.

Table 1
Legislative Record and Identifying Officials' Orientation on Cuba

	Legislative Item Advocates Pro-Hard-Line	Legislative Item Advocates Anti-Hard- Line
Official Took a Pro-Hard-Line Position if:	Sponsored Item Co-Sponsored Item Voted for Item	Voted Against Item Voted to Table Item
Official Took an Anti-Hard-Line Position if:	Voted Against Item Voted to Table Item	Sponsored Item Co-Sponsored Item Voted for Item

Any official that took a position at least three times and advocated a hard-line position by a two to one ratio or more was deemed a hard-line official. Any official that took a position at least three times and supported an anti-hard-line position by a two to one ratio or more was deemed an anti-hard-line official. Those who did not meet these criteria were designated as having no clear opinion on Cuba. The voting records for each official in the two periods was limited to the respective period and the items in each respective period. For example, an official that took a pro-hard-line position 5 times and an anti-hard-line position 0 times in Period A would be deemed as a hard-line official for that period. The same individual could have done the opposite in Period B (0 pro-hard-line and 5 anti-hard-line) making him or her a non-hard-line official.

The author then determined the total number of days that hard-line officials held these six powerful chairs. The dates of holding committee chairs did not necessarily coincide with each other or with the sessions of Congress. Two sources provided most of these dates of service. Information for the 101st and 102nd sessions of Congress came from *Committees in the U.S. Congress, 1947-1992*, published by *Congressional Quarterly*.⁵² MIT students Charles Stewart III and Jonathan Woon compiled a database that lists committee assignments from 1993 through July 12, 2005, covering most of the 103rd through 109th sessions.⁵³ Archived committee web pages were consulted (available at www.archive.org) to account for any changes in committee membership that occurred after July 12, 2005.

Random samples of Radio Martí airchecks were selected for 1997 and 2005. These years were chosen because they occurred near the end of each period prior to the significant change the delineated each period. The author did not want to draw a sample from the last year in each period because these times would have coincided with congressional elections in the United States. These times would have been inappropriate because the content might have included extensive coverage of domestic politics.

Each of the 8,760 hours in 1997 and 2005 was assigned a number from one to 8,760 with each number corresponding to the hour's chronological order within the corresponding year. The hour from midnight to 1:00 a.m. on January 1 was hour one. The hour from 11:00 p.m. to midnight on December 31 was hour 8,760. Using a random number generator, the researcher selected 25 hours of content from 1997 and 25 hours of content from 2005. Any selection that occurred within 48 hours of an already selected hour was discarded to minimize the possibility of repeated programs or topics.

The first unit of analysis was program segment, defined as any portion of a program that addressed the same primary matter of interest. The length of each program segment varied from a few seconds needed to deliver a news story to an entire hour needed to carry a baseball game. The author concedes that the latter consists of several different program segments but argues that it would be incorrect to count each as a separate unit because the subject did not change.

Coders determined if the program segment, as a whole, was consistent with the

hard-liners' agenda. The hard-line frame was based on the following description:

The hard-line Cuban American community uses Radio Martí to promote itself.

The hard-line Cuban American community wants to rebuild Cuba once Fidel Castro is no longer in power.

The hard-line Cuban American community is concerned about issues related to the Cuban American community primarily based in south Florida.

The hard-line Cuban American community has antagonized Fidel Castro and the Cuban government.

The hard-line Cuban American community has called Fidel Castro several derogatory names and used derogatory words such as but not limited to dictator, tyrant, despot, authoritarian, totalitarian, autocrat, absolute ruler, oppressor, cruel, malicious, sadistic, merciless, vindictive, vicious, heartless, ruthless, harsh, callous and evil.

The hard-line Cuban American community wants Fidel Castro to die.

The hard-line Cuban American community wants to punish Fidel Castro, his government and supporters.

People in the hard-line Cuban American community want to be compensated for property they (not U.S. businesses) lost in Cuba when Fidel Castro came to power.

The hard-line Cuban American community accuses Fidel Castro and the Cuban government of sponsoring terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction.

The hard-line Cuban American community accuses Fidel Castro and the Cuban government of espionage.

Any content that did not fit this category was coded as "Other." This "Other" category included content that was framed objectively or opposed a hard-line strategy.

This analysis also examined a second unit of analysis, five-minute segments. Research Question three proposed the examination of segment intensity, the repeated use of hard-line frames within a standard time period. A five-minute segment that used no hard-line frames would have no intensity. A five-minute segment that used one hard-line frame would have low intensity. A five-minute segment that implemented a hard-line frame five times would have high intensity, averaging one hard-line frame every minute. If hard-line influence translated to hard-line content, one would hypothesize that not only would there be more topics implement a hard-line frame, but also that the frames would be used more frequently.

Table 2
Comparison of Legislative Items in Periods A and B

	Pro-Hard-Line Items	Anti-Hard-Line Items	TOTAL
Period A	61	45	106
Period B	24	107	131
TOTAL	85	152	237

$$X^2(2, N=237) = 39.19, p < .001$$

The author believed that message intensity needed to be explored to provide another dimension to the analysis. The program segments used in the first portion of this analysis varied in length. In some cases it took several minutes to frame a single program segment. Other times it took less than one minute. The author felt that only noting how often frames were used did not provide a complete description of the content. If an hour-long program spent the entire time covering one subject and did so using a hard-line frame, this would be counted as one program segment that used a hard-line frame. If the first 30-second news story in an hour-long news program used a hard-line frame, it would also be counted as one program segment that used a hard-line. The obvious difference between the two is that one lasted an entire hour and the other lasted just 30 seconds.

By using the five-minute segment as a unit of analysis, each hour-long program described above would be divided into 12 five-minute segments. For the first program, each of the 12 five-minute segments would be counted as having one hard-line frame each. For the second program, the first five-minute segment would be counted as using one hard-line frame and the remaining 11 five-minute segments would be counted as using zero hard-line frames each.

To measure message intensity, each hour of content was divided into 12 five-minute segments with the frequency of hard-line and "Other" frames counted within each segment. The first segment began at the top of the hour (00:00) and ended at 04:59. The remaining segments followed accordingly (05:00 to 09:59, 10:00 to 14:59, etc.). A topic that began during one segment but extended

to another segment was counted as occurring in both.

Results: Committee Chairs

There were 106 legislative items in Period A. Of these, 61 were designated as pro-hard-line and 45 were anti-hard-line. There were 131 legislative items in Period B. Of these, 24 were pro-hard-line and 107 were anti-hard-line items. To ensure that the results were attributable to the content and not the coder's interpretation of the content or coder bias, a second coder examined every fifth item in each of the two periods. A Scott's Pi analysis comparing responses of the two different coders produced an intercoder reliability value of 0.91. Although there were differences between the two coders, this value was sufficient to indicate that the results were valid.

A 2 x 2 chi-square analysis comparing the legislative items in the two periods found the relationship to be significant ($p < .001$). This validated the argument that the hard-liners' influence in Washington decreased. The fact that these anti-hard-line items were submitted but reached a dead end (there were no significant changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba) suggests that the hard-liners' influence had diminished but still managed to use the committee chairs to hinder anti-hard-line legislation. See Table 2.

An analysis of the six powerful committee chairs confirmed what was expected. Of the 21,145 days in which these six chairs were occupied in Period A, hard-liners controlled the chairs 10,874 days (51.43 percent) with non-hard-liners controlling the remaining 10,271 (48.57 percent). In Period B, hard-liners controlled the chairs for 11,877 of the

Table 3
Control of Chairs by Hard-Line and Other Officials

	Days Chairs Controlled by Hard-Line Officials	Days Chairs Controlled by Other Officials	TOTAL
Period A	10,874	10,271	21,145
Period B	11,877	5,109	16,986
TOTAL	22,751	15,380	38,131

$$X^2(2, N=38,131) = 1,339.05, p < .001$$

16,986 cumulative days (69.92 percent) and non-hard-liners controlled the remaining 5,109 (30.08 percent). A 2 x 2 chi-square analysis found this to be a significant relationship ($p < .001$). The author believes that the answer to Research Question 1 is “yes.” See Table 3 above.

Subject as Unit of Analysis

In each of the two samples, eight hours were randomly selected to test for inter-coder reliability. This represented almost a third of the content in each period. A Scott’s Pi analysis comparing responses of two different coders produced a result of 0.92.

Most of the content did not use a hard-line frame. Of the 363 program segments in the 1997 sample, 87 (23.97 percent) used a hard-line frame and 276 (76.03 percent) did not. Of the 420 program segments in the 2005 sample, 138 (32.86 percent) used a hard-line frame and 282 (67.14 percent) did not. Of the 282 program segments that did not use a hard-line frame, none opposed a hard-line frame (See Table 4). Some were statements issued by the Department of State expressing official U.S. policy. Exact numbers for this category may be available upon further analysis.

There was an increase in hard-line frames from one period to the next. A 2 x 2 chi-

square analysis comparing the program segments for both periods found this to be a significant relationship ($p < .01$). The researcher believes that the answer to Research Question 2 is “yes.”

Five-Minute Segment as Unit of Analysis

The Period A sample consisted of 25 hours, which totaled 300 five-minute segments. The hard-line frame was used 97 times for an average of 0.32 times in each segment. “Other” frames were used on 429 occasions for an average of 1.43 times in each segment. The Period B sample consisted of 24 complete hours and 20 minutes of another hour (the remaining 40 minutes were silent), which totaled 292 five-minute segments. The hard-line frame was used on 212 occasions for an average of 0.73 times per five-minute segment. “Other” frames were used on 381 occasions for a total of 1.30 times per five-minute segment.

The reader is reminded that, for this portion of the analysis, content that extended from one five-minute segment to another was counted as separate segments. For example a baseball game that lasted an entire hour was counted 12 times, once for each of the hour’s 12 five-minute segments. If the entire game did not use a hard-line frame, each of the 12 five-minute segments was

Table 4
Frequency of Frames in Periods A and B

	Hard-Line Frame	Other Frame	TOTAL
Period A	87	276	363
Period B	138	282	420
TOTAL	225	558	783

$$X^2(2, N=783) = 7.51, p < .01$$

coded as such. This is different than the first portion of the analysis in which the frame was counted as occurring only once. As a result, the numbers for frames used to answer the different questions are inconsistent. It is also worth noting that a segment that lasted less than five minutes was counted as an entire five-minute segment.

A two-tailed t-test indicated that the increased intensity of hard-line frames from Period A to Period B was significant ($p < .001$). A t-test measuring the difference in “Other” frames from Period A to B showed that the change was not significant. Based on these results, the researcher believes that the answer to Research Question 3 is “yes.” Not only were hard-line frames used more often in Period B, they were also more intense.

Discussion

The author believes that the high number of “Other” frames in all three periods can be attributed to the fact that the station used them when covering issues not directly related to Cuba or the United States. For example, a news story about a terrorist bombing in Europe might have little to do with Cuba or the United States. Almost all of these stories were told in a generic way, mimicking the style from news wires, and may not have even mentioned the United States or Cuba. A music or entertainment program would be unlikely to have issues that have distinct positions. As a result, they would be regarded as objective. Constantly promoting a hard-line agenda would have caused the audience to tune out. Although the hard-line frames were not dominant, the results did show a significant increase in their implementation that coincided with an increased control of powerful committee chairs.

In Table 5, the author has noted the orientation on Cuba-related legislation for all of the committee chairs during the two periods. As Table 5 on the next page shows, the number of days that hard-liners controlled chairs increased slightly from Period A to Period B. The number of days that anti-hard-liners controlled chairs drastically decreased

from Period A to Period B. Anti-hard-line officials controlled these six chairs a total of 5,268 days in Period A (24.91 percent of the total days) but 517 days in Period B (3.04 percent of the total days). This means that there was a limited amount of time in which hard-line opponents, who would have also opposed hard-line rhetoric on Radio Martí, could have forced the stations to change. The chairs that had no clear opinion on Cuba may not have supported Radio Martí but did not make correcting the station a priority either.

The author believes this is further evidence of a residual effect of the hard-liners’ lobbying. When Helms, Young, Gilman and other hard-liners relinquished their control of their respective committee chairs, they were generally replaced by other hard-liners. The hard-liners erred by failing to lobby a sufficient number of Democrats to prepare for the Republicans’ inevitable loss of control of both chambers. Although it was not included in this analysis, the author also noted the chairs that took over after the Democrats’ dual victory in 2006. Based on their voting record in Period B, none of the replacement chairs were pro-hard-liners and three were anti-hard-liners. This would suggest that Radio Martí’s content became less hostile during this period.

Conclusion

In this study, the only substantial change related to Radio Martí’s operation from Period A to Period B was the increased control of powerful committee chairs relevant to the station’s operation. The station’s content clearly changed from Period A to Period B in accordance with this power shift in regard to the frequency of topics that used a hard-line frame and the intensity in which that frame was used. The author believes this provides a substantial amount of evidence of a residual effect of hard-line lobbying. Although they were a much smaller group, the hard-line exiles that were involved with Radio Martí were allowed to continue to use hard-line rhetoric. The next logical question is whether or not the station’s content moved to the center af-

ter hard-liners lost control of these chairs. A already underway.
follow up study to answer this question is

Table 5
Officials Who Held Powerful Committee Seats During Both Periods

	Senate Committee Chairs Period A			House Committee Chairs Period A		
	Approp.	Budget	For. Rel.	Approp.	Budget	For. Rel.
1989-90	Byrd (WV) xx	Sasser (TN) xx	Pell (RI) - -	Whitten (MS) ++	Panetta (CA) - -	Fascell (FL) ++
1991-92	Byrd (WV) xx	Sasser (TN) xx	Pell (RI) - -	Whitten (MS) ++	Panetta (CA) - -	Fascell (FL) ++
1993-94	Byrd (WV) xx	Sasser (TN) xx	Pell (RI) - -	Natcher ¹ (KY) xx Obey ¹ (WI) - -	Sabo (MN) - -	Hamilton (IN) xx
1995-96	Hatfield (OR) xx	Domenici (NM) ++	Helms (NC) ++	Livingston (LA) ++	Kasich (OH) ++	Gilman (NY) ++
1997-98	Stevens (AK) ++	Domenici (NM) ++	Helms (NC) ++	Livingston (LA) ++	Kasich (OH) ++	Gilman (NY) ++
	Senate Committee Chairs Period B			House Committee Chairs Period B		
1999-00	Stevens (AK) ++	Domenici (NM) ++	Helms (NC) ++	Young (FL) ++	Kasich (OH) ++	Gilman (NY) ++
2001-02	Stevens ² (AK) ++ Byrd ² (WV) xx	Domenici ² (NM) ++ Conrad ² (ND) - -	Helms ² (NC) ++ Biden ² (DE) xx	Young (FL) ++	Nussle (IA) xx	Hyde (IL) ++
2003-04	Stevens (AK) ++	Nickles (OK) ++	Lugar (IN) xx	Young (FL) ++	Nussle (IA) xx	Hyde (IL) ++
2005-06	Cochran (MS) ++	Gregg (NH) ++	Lugar (IN) xx	Lewis (CA) ++	Nussle (IA) xx	Hyde (IL) ++
2007-08	Byrd (WV) xx	Conrad (ND) xx	Biden (DE) xx	Obey (WI) - -	Spratt (SC) - -	Lantos (CA) - -

++ Consistently advocated a hard-line position

- - Consistently opposed a hard-line position

xx Had no clear opinion on Cuba

1 = William Natcher died on March 29, 1994. David Obey took over as chair of Senate Appropriations Committee on April 12, 1994. The seat was vacant for the two weeks between those dates.

2 = On June 6, 2001 when James Jeffords (VT-I) announced that he would caucus with the Democrats instead of the Republicans. This gave the Democrats majority control in the Senate, which included control of all committee chairs.

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