



The Determinants of Nationalism and The Effect of Conscription on National Pride *Dhivesh Dadlani, Harvard University*

I. Introduction

Nationalism refers to an individual's loyalty to their nation and feelings of patriotism. Much of the literature in economics tries to understand the relationship between the nation-building process and the economy. However, there is little empirical evidence documenting how the process of nation building works and the tools that governments can use to influence nationalism in a country. But why care at all about nationalism and nation-building?

Nation-building has been used to solve a variety of problems, especially in societies with ethnically fragmented populations (Ahlerup and Hanson, 2011). Ethnically fragmented countries tend to face poor economic and political performance. Studies have found multiple negative outcomes related to ethnic diversity such as distorted provision of public goods, enablement of corruption and consequently, poor economic growth. In using nation-building as a policy tool, the government essentially create unity in a country and pride in one's nation, rather than unity within ethnic groups. If such a policy could work to reduce the detriments of ethnic diversity and fractionalization, then it is worth understanding how nationalistic sentiments are influenced.

Further, having served in the Singapore Police Force (SPF) during my two years of mandatory national service, I have experienced the effect of conscription on me as well as my peers' sentiments towards the nation. Recruits in all lines of service – military, police and civil defence – wake up at 0530 hours to sing the country's anthem and recite a pledge to signify national unity. Two years of training and on-the-ground service will affect the way one feels about their country.

In this paper, I aim to provide empirical evidence about the determinants of nationalism and the effect of conscription on nationalism. In doing so, I will present my own views about why some factors affect nationalism in various ways. I aim to test the following hypotheses in this paper:

1. Conscription forces men to serve their nation and throughout their years of service, they become more nationalistic.
2. On an individual level, income and education would negatively correlate with nationalistic sentiments while trust, confidence in one's government, age and political interest would positively correlate with nationalism.
3. On the country level, international wars, average confidence in governments and average trust levels would positively correlate with nationalism while GDP per capita, openness of economies, civil wars and conflicts would negatively correlate with nationalism.

This paper will be structured as follows. First I will review the existing economic literature on nationalism. Next, I will describe the data I use for my analysis. Following this, I will bring the individual level determinants of nationalism to light before diving into data on Spain to understand the effects of conscription on nationalism. This will conclude the section on individual-level evidence. I will then present the evidence on the possible factors that influence nationalism on a country level before proceeding to explain why some interesting correlations exist. Lastly, I will conclude.

II. Literature Review

Few studies have explained nationalism in various contexts. Two of them study nationalism from a quantitative aspect. Ahlerup and Hannson (2011) empirically assessed the effects of nationalist sentiments on government effectiveness, using a cross-section of countries. They used the World Value Survey to measure the intensity of nationalistic sentiments using questions about national pride. I use the same survey question to measure nationalism as I will explain in Section 3. Their paper had two main findings. First, there was a “hump-shaped relationship between nationalism and government effectiveness” (Ahlerup and Hanson, 2011, p. 432). They attributed this to their theory that there are different forces at play at different levels of nationalism. Concretely, they believed that nationalism had positive effects on government effectiveness at low levels of nationalism and negative effects at high levels of nationalism. Second, they found that nationalism could erode the “negative association between ethnic fractionalization and government effectiveness in former colonies” (Ahlerup and Hanson, 2011, p. 432).

The second study that empirically assessed effects used the same measure of nationalism as well as data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Shulman (2003) was interested in testing the hypothesis that 1) richer countries and richer individuals were more nationalistic and 2) nations with less economic inequality amongst individuals and ethnic groups were more nationalistic. He found that relative and absolute wealth, as well as economic equality, were in general, not positively related to nationalism. Specifically, in only 6 out of the 20 countries he studied were there significant relationships between nationalism and income. In these six countries, the relationship was negative, which means that poorer people were likely to be more nationalistic (Shulman, 2003). He adds in various controls – class, settlement size, education, ethnicity, religiosity, age and sex – and still finds only a few statistical relationships. Again, in each case, the relationship is negative.

There have been many studies about nationalism and nation-building from a theoretical standpoint. Alesina and Reich (2015) studied nation-building across political regime and in transition periods, where they defined nation building “as a process which leads to the formation of countries in which the citizens feel a sufficient amount of commonality of interests, goals and preferences so that they do not wish to separate from each other” (Alesina and Reich, 2015, p. 3). They were interested to understand the reasons why European elites, the Soviet Union and other dictatorships wanted to homogenize their populations and why certain colonies engaged in nation-building after independence. They argued that in non-democracies, rulers are motivated to homogenize populations when they fear democratization as 1) it allows people in charge to implement their own preferred policies even if democracy prevails and 2) homogenization may reduce any ill-feelings towards their rule and reduce incentives to overthrow them. Essentially, they believed that leaders facing the threat of being overthrown may use homogenization and indoctrination through nation-building to make people less averse to their rule. They presented some historical evidence to illustrate their argument (Alesina and Reich, 2015). In my paper, I do not analyze these issues but it is worth understanding that countries used nation-building to homogenize populations in the past.

While the above paper explained why some countries undertook nation-building policies, Barry Posen (1993) wrote about the relationship between nationalism and war. He claimed that nationalism is to be feared because of its close relationship with warfare. Nationalism could cause countries to undertake foreign policies that bring about war or even prolong and intensify war through many mechanisms. He argued that nationalism intensifies warfare through allowing the state to mass mobilize the “creative energies and the spirit of self-

sacrifice of millions of soldiers” and wrote that nationalism is used as a tool by states to enhance their military capabilities (Posen, 1993, p. 81). He also used evidence from the history of France and Prussia/Germany to show how conscription rules changed and these rules affected the building of a mass army as well as its effect on nationalism. In some instances, conscription intensified solidarity among youth but in other cases, where exemptions to conscription were possible, conscription failed to intensify nationalistic sentiments (Posen, 1993). It is worthy to note that Posen focused on the role of education in building nationalistic sentiments and this was important in his analysis. For example, he wrote that, in France, children were taught patriotism. They were told that their main duty was to defend their nation and that people in the army were just like them (Posen, 1993). Bandiera et al. (2017) also study the effect of compulsory schooling laws on nation-building in the context of America.

Where the literature on conscription is concerned, Alesina, Reich, and Riboni (2017) wrote about how states switched from mercenaries to mass armies via conscription in the late 18th century. Though people faced punishments if they did not comply and defected, the authors claimed that wars cannot be won with unmotivated soldiers. Thus, the elites had to reduce rents and provide public goods to make citizens voluntarily comply with conscription. This made citizens and soldiers believe that if they lost the war, they would lose public goods, “which they learned to appreciate because of nation-building” (Alesina, Reich, and Riboni, 2017, p. 3). Essentially, nations used indoctrination and instilled patriotism to increase the value of public goods to motivate soldiers to fight for their country. It is important to note that their paper was concerned with making people voluntarily comply with conscription and did not consider the effects of conscription on nationalism and nation-building. The latter is the relationship I explore in my paper.

The above papers explored the various determinants and advantages of nation-building and nationalism. They also tied together the ideas of warfare, conscription and nationalism. However, as of now, much of the work is theoretical and relies on historical arguments. My paper will be similar to the first two described in this section, in that it will explore the observable variation in nationalistic sentiments within and across countries.

III. Data Description

The primary source of data for individual analyses comes from the World Value Survey (WVS) longitudinal dataset. This dataset contains responses to surveys conducted in 100 countries over the time period of 1981 to 2014. The primary variable that I will use as a proxy or indicator of Nationalism is the answer question G006: "How proud are you to be [Nationality]?" In this paper, I refer to this variable as Nationalism or National Pride. In exploring the determinants of nationalism on an individual level, I ran regressions on the following variables: income, education, a dummy for active in the military, gender, age, confidence in government, general trust levels, religiosity, interest in politics, and marital status. These variables come from different questions in the WVS. A summary of the questions is given in Appendix 1. Though each question was taken directly from the survey, some variables were coded differently from the original WVS coding. For instance, responses from G006, nationalism, were reverse coded. While 1,2,3 4 represented “Very Proud”, “Quite Proud”, “Not Very Proud” and “Not At All Proud” respectively in the original documentation, I used reverse coding for easier interpretation of diagrams. Further, all missing values for these questions were dropped. Values could be missing for several reasons including: question not being asked, respondent, not knowing the answer to the question or respondent choosing not to answer the question for a variety of reasons.

Data for country-level analyses comes from a variety of sources. These sources are: WVS, World Development Indicator (WDI), UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset, Major Episodes of Political Violence and Conflict Region (1946-2016), the Polity IV project, Conscription as Regulation (Mulligan and Shleifer, 2005), The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008). A summary of the key variables used in each of the datasets is shown in Appendix 2.

For conscription data, a few sources were used. Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) was the primary source of data for country-year pairs before 2000. Conscription is coded 1 if there was more than 1 draft month in that year. Since Mulligan and Shleifer only provided data for years 1970-2000 in 5 year intervals, if an observation is not in any of the years in Mulligan and Shleifer's dataset, I cross-referenced this with Wikipedia, the CIA World Factbook and www.globalsecurity.org to check if there was any change to conscription laws in that country between that time-period. For example, Albania has 12 months of conscription according to Shleifer and Mulligan in 1995. Since the observation in my dataset was for the year 1998 and Shleifer and Mulligan did not provide an estimate of the year 2000, I referenced Wikipedia. Since Wikipedia reveals that conscription was removed in 2010 in Albania, conscription was coded as 1 for Albania-1998 in my dataset. Very importantly, due to data limitations, conscription is coded 1 if conscription is selective, lottery-based or just compulsory. Lastly, if there was no information in any of the above four sources, conscription was left for that observation as a missing value. Consequently, that country-year pair did not play a role in my analysis.

IV. Individual Level Determinants of Nationalism

To understand the determinants of nationalism, I used all the data from 100 countries and in all waves of the WVS. The repeated cross-section regression framework is shown below:

$$(1) \quad Y_{ict} = \lambda_t + \gamma_c + X'_{ict}\beta + \varepsilon_{ict}$$

where Y_{ict} is the nationalism level of individual i in country c at time t , γ_c and λ_t are the country and year fixed effects respectively, and X'_{ict} are the independent variables income, education, gender, age, confidence in the government, general trust levels, interest in politics and dummies for marital status as well as whether an individual is a member of the armed forces.

To understand the data and variation in nationalism, I refer to Figure 1. This figure shows a clear positive relationship between National Pride and age in 4 different countries. The strength of the relationship clearly varies across countries. For instance, in Turkey, every person surveyed between the age of 79 to 83 in Wave 4, responded "Very Proud" to the question about national pride. In the above regression framework, I controlled for the national differences and time trends through the country and year fixed effects, thus only comparing individuals within a country in a specific year, and repeating this for every country and every year in the dataset.

The Determinants of Nationalism




Figure 1: Graph of Nationalism Vs Age in 4 countries in Wave 4

Table 1 below shows the results of the above regression on various independent variables. Income seems to have a marginal effect on nationalism, both in a bivariate regression as well as regressions with controls. Education levels are negatively correlated with nationalism. Both sex and trust do not have a significant effect. Age, government confidence, religiosity and interest in politics have strong positive significant relationships with nationalism. Being married and serving in the military are also positively correlated. Most of these results are not shocking. Older people tend to be prouder of the country they have belonged to for many years. Military personnel are either serving because they are patriotic or have become patriotic due to military service. Having an interest in politics means that one would be interested in affairs on a national level, which can explain the relationship observed.

On the other hand, there are some results that are unexpected. I would fully expect that if people trusted others in their country, there would be a higher chance that they would be patriotic. A possible explanation is that when people are asked, "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?", they recall people they spend time with rather than people in general. Though people could trust their close circle, they may not necessarily be proud of their nation at large, in which case we cannot say much about the correlation between these two variables. Another interesting finding is the relationship between education and nationalism. It seems that as people pursue further education, they lose a sense of pride for their nation. Perhaps, this is because students typically learn about their country before high school and as they proceed, they forget their education about their nation and focus more on specific topics that interest them. However, an in-depth analysis of this finding is out of the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, from a nation-building policy perspective, governments can consider revisiting their syllabus and introducing topics that are meant to build a sense of national unity in students.

Table 1: Determinants of Nationalism

	Dependent variable is National Pride												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Income	-0.00392*** (0.000682)						-0.00389*** (0.000683)	-0.00110 (0.000684)	-0.00105 (0.000675)	-0.00129* (0.000684)	-0.000684 (0.000673)	-0.00129* (0.000676)	-0.00177*** (0.000678)
Education		-0.0202*** (0.000695)											
Military			0.0554*** (0.0142)										
Sex				-0.00454 (0.00289)			-0.00392 (0.00289)	-0.00678** (0.00289)	-0.00477* (0.00285)	-0.00694** (0.00289)	0.00782*** (0.00285)	0.00372 (0.00288)	0.00336 (0.00288)
Age					0.00369*** (0.0000956)			0.00368*** (0.0000962)	0.00334*** (0.0000951)	0.00368*** (0.0000962)	0.00295*** (0.0000953)	0.00288*** (0.0000954)	0.00269*** (0.0000986)
Confidence in Government						0.116*** (0.00171)			0.113*** (0.00171)		0.110*** (0.00170)	0.109*** (0.00171)	0.108*** (0.00171)
Trust										0.0191*** (0.00349)	0.00272 (0.00345)	0.00105 (0.00345)	0.00113 (0.00345)
Religiosity											0.143*** (0.00371)	0.142*** (0.00371)	0.142*** (0.00371)
Interest in Politics												0.0170*** (0.00162)	0.0169*** (0.00162)
Marital Status													0.0235*** (0.00315)
Time Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R ²	0.188	0.191	0.188	0.188	0.193	0.206	0.188	0.193	0.211	0.193	0.217	0.218	0.218
N	212539	212538	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539

Standard errors in parentheses
 * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Ben Enke (2018) wrote about the role of morals in the US 2016 presidential elections. He described the fine line between individualizing values and communal values. Individualizing values are “prescriptive judgements of justice, rights and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other” (Enke, 2018, p. 1). Communal values, on the other hand, are concerned with loyalty and obedience to a hierarchy. It relies heavily on notions of “us” and “them” and “applications of moral principles depend on context” (Enke, 2018 p. 1). Concretely, harm, care, fairness and reciprocity are individualizing values while respect, authority, loyalty and in-group such as family or country are communal values. Table 2 presents the relationship between nationalism and certain cultural values. In some sense, nationalism can be seen as the ultimate form of moral communalism and we expect there to be a positive relationship between those who show moral communalism and those that are nationalistic. We can see that there is indeed a positive relationship between moral communalism and nationalism from columns 1, 2 and 3. People who believe in the importance of family, as well as duties to parents and children, are on average more nationalistic.

Table 2: Nationalism and Moral Values

Correlations of National Pride with Culture					
<i>Dependent Variable is National Pride</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Full Sample	Full Sample	Full Sample	Wave 4	Full Sample
Always Respect Parents	0.237*** (0.00599)				
Importance of Family		0.171*** (0.00409)			
Responsibility of Parents to children			0.137*** (0.00470)		
Is Violence Justifiable				-0.0234*** (0.00135)	
Aversion to Homosexuals as Neighbors					0.0597*** (0.00294)
Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.170	0.179	0.166	0.189	0.173
N	150653	312130	149525	82992	288332

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

V. Conscription and Nationalism - Evidence from Spain

The removal of conscription in Spain makes for a good natural experiment to understand how conscription affects nationalism. Though the ideal setting would be to study a country that decided to introduce conscription at some point, the data from the WVS did not contain any

country that introduced conscription between the survey period. However, in 2001, Spain decided to abolish the law that mandated young men to serve for nine months in the military. The Defense Minister gave a speech in 2001 telling the public that by December 31st, 2001, men would no longer need to serve their nation. Military service would be completely voluntary and men can declare themselves objectors until one day before their official service period (Elmundo). For context, women were never required to serve in the military. Men who turn 18 before 2001 would have needed to serve in the military but men who turned 18 in 2001 or after, would never be mandated to, except for times of national emergency (CIA World Factbook). Given that I have data on Spain in 2007, I can compare the national pride of groups that were affected by this law and groups that were not. Specifically, men aged 24 and below in 2007 would never have been required to serve. Men aged 25 and above would have been required to serve. On the other hand, females of all ages were never required to serve.

Given this, using data from 2007, I used the following difference-in-difference framework to analyze the effect of not having to serve in the military, on nationalism:

$$(2) \quad Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Male}_i + \beta_2 \text{Below25}_i + \beta_3 (\text{Below25}_i * \text{Male}_i) + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the nationalism level of individual i , Male_i is a dummy variable indicating if an individual is male and Below25_i is a dummy variable indicating if an individual is below 25 years of age in 2007. Essentially, we are taking the difference between females aged 25 and above and females 24 and below, and comparing it to the difference between males aged 25 and above and males 24 and below. I restricted the sample to males between the age 21-29 so that the groups I compared are almost similar in age. An underlying assumption here is that this difference should not exist, in the absence of this law.




Figure 2: Nationalism Levels for Males and Females Across Groups

As we can see from Figure 2, males are on average, in 2007, more patriotic if they are part of the younger group than the older group while the evidence for females is consistent with the earlier finding that age tends to correlate positively with nationalism. To test the assumption that there should be no difference between the difference in males and the difference in females, in the absence of this law, I applied the same framework using data in 1995 and 2000. Figure 3 and Table 3 present the findings.

Table 3: Causal Effect of Removing Mandatory National Service of Nationalism

Causal Effect of Removing Mandatory Conscription on Nationalism				
<i>Dependent Variable is National Pride</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2007 Sample: Ages > 20	2007 Sample: Ages 21-29	2000 Sample: Ages 21-29	1995 Sample: Ages 21-29
Male	-0.103** (0.0425)	-0.216 (0.142)	-0.191 (0.211)	-0.157 (0.195)
Age Below 25	-0.345** (0.159)	-0.270 (0.181)	0.311* (0.180)	0.134 (0.146)
Diff-in-Diff	0.444** (0.194)	0.557** (0.238)	0.0575 (0.260)	0.0624 (0.249)
N	931	146	119	151

Standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The results from Figure 3 and Table 3 illustrate two important points. First, from Figure 3, we can see that the difference across males and females have followed the same trend from 1995 to 2000. Second, there are no significant differences between differences in females and differences in males, in both 2000 and 1995. As such, under the assumption that there would be no difference in the absence of the law, there is a positive causal effect of not having to serve on nationalistic sentiments.

This does not provide evidence that conscription always negatively impacts nationalism. Rather, it provides evidence that if a country already requires people to serve, then getting rid of that law could increase nationalistic sentiments of people who were going to serve, but did not have to due to the law. This distinction is extremely important. I argue that the following factors caused this change in sentiments. Conscription takes away the right to choose if one wants to serve. Many conscripts never actually want to serve but do so because they must. Once potential conscripts expect that they must serve, they get conditioned to it and when they are told that they no longer will need to, they would feel more patriotic towards their nation. Further, for people just above the cutoff, there is a sense of resentment that they were not “spared” and were made to serve. This could lead to them feeling less proud of their country. These two effects combined could cause the difference to become larger, thus explaining the significant positive effect of removing conscription on nationalistic attitudes.




Figure 3: Difference-in-Differences over time

VI. Country Level Determinants

Data from the WVS allows us to understand the variation in nationalism from the country level. Given that there is data about different economic indicators and political events, we can analyze how nationalism correlates with other factors on a country level. Again, to understand the data from a country perspective, I refer to Figure 4. These figures show the relationship between various factors – Trade openness, General Trust Levels, General Confidence in the Government and Religiosity – and average national pride in a country.

Table 4 shows the results of simple regressions of national pride on some economic factors. GDP per capita does not have any effect on nationalism. Trade has a small negative effect on nationalism. I argue that if countries are more globalized and economically integrated, citizens tend to have pride for the world at large rather than pride for their country. Further, much evidence points to the fact that when countries have more nationalistic sentiments, they tend to introduce protectionist policies to promote job growth within their country. Taxes have a slight positive effect on nationalism, though this effect is marginally significant and not very large.

The Determinants of Nationalism




Figure 4: Relationship Between Nationalism and Various Factors

Table 4: Nationalism and Trade, GDP and Tax Rates

Correlations Between Nationalism and Economic Factors						
<i>Dependent Variable is Avg. National Pride</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GDP/Cap	-0.00000230 (0.00000206)	-0.00000217 (0.00000214)				
Trade as % of GDP			-0.00199*** (0.000748)	-0.00206** (0.000794)		
Taxes as % of Govt Revenue					0.00343* (0.00198)	0.00367* (0.00188)
Wave Fixed Effects	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
R ²	0.018	0.037	0.079	0.100	0.013	0.060
N	156	156	156	156	121	121

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 5 shows us the relationship between nationalism and incidences of conflict, both civil and international. As we can see, national pride is correlated with all types of conflict. The relationship between international violence and nationalism can partially be explained by the fact that the nation rallies together against the enemy. Further, Alesina et al. (2017) write that in times of war, states typically engage in nation-building activities as well as negative propaganda against the enemy, thus creating a stronger sense of nationalism. On the other hand, the strong positive relationship between civil war and intrastate conflict with the

government is surprising. I offer two explanations for this. First, governments may try to influence nationalism and create a national identity as a response to civil conflict. Second, individuals answering the questions may be proud of the side that they are for and consider that side their nation, instead of looking at the nation at large. An in-depth analysis of this is, unfortunately, out of the scope of this paper.

Table 5: Nationalism and Conflict

Correlations Between Nationalism and Conflict Indicators			
<i>Dependent Variable is Avg. National Pride</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Incidence of intrastate conflict	0.197*** (0.0454)		
Magnitude of International war and violence		0.0478*** (0.00697)	
Magnitude of Civil war and violence			0.0398*** (0.00979)
R^2	0.078	0.014	0.048
N	156	156	156

Standard errors in parentheses
 * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6 presents evidence of relationships between nationalism and political factors. There is no significant relationship between the strength of democracy or legal origins on nationalism. There seems to be a strong negative relationship between trust and nationalism, as well as conscription and nationalism. Where average confidence in the government and religiosity are concerned, coefficients are strong and positive.

Table 6: Correlations Between Nationalism and Political Factors

Correlations Between Nationalism and Political Factors											
<i>Dependent Variable is Avg. National Pride</i>											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Democracy Index	-0.00525 (0.00430)	-0.00425 (0.00438)									
Avg. Trust			-0.493*** (0.128)	-0.486*** (0.130)							
Avg. Religiosity					0.641*** (0.0978)	0.632*** (0.102)					
Avg. Confidence in Government							0.198*** (0.0603)	0.192*** (0.0619)			
Conscription									-0.161*** (0.0449)	-0.157*** (0.0464)	
French Legal Origins											0.0692 (0.0472)
Wave Fixed Effects	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
R^2	0.010	0.029	0.073	0.093	0.204	0.215	0.066	0.083	0.074	0.089	0.014
N	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156

Standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The Determinants of Nationalism




Figure 5: Relationship between Nationalism and Various Cultural Factors

Table 7 presents the evidence of the relationship between nationalism and cultural factors as discussed in the individual level analysis. Figure 5 depicts these relationships. We can see that the correlation between moral values and nationalism still holds when we exploit variation at the country level.

Table 7: Nationalism and Moral Values (Country)

Correlations of National Pride with Culture					
<i>Dependent Variable is National Pride</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Full Sample	Full Sample	Full Sample	Wave 4	Wave 6
Always Respect Parents	1.124*** (0.351)				
Importance of Family		1.645*** (0.3)			
Responsibility of Parents to children			1.440*** (0.176)		
Is Violence Justifiable				0.0239 (0.0414)	
Aversion to Homosexuals as Neighbors					0.362*** (0.119)
Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
R ²	0.163	0.232	0.391	0.002	0.098
N	114	225	114	60	57

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 8: Country Level Determinants of Nationalism

Regression on Multiple Factors											
<i>Dependent Variable is Avg. National Pride</i>											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
GDP/Cap	-0.00000217 (0.00000214)	-0.00000131 (0.00000209)	0.00000106 (0.00000133)	0.00000132 (0.00000109)	0.00000202* (0.00000110)	0.00000202* (0.00000110)	0.00000155 (0.000000952)	0.00000213* (0.00000112)	0.00000188 (0.00000122)	0.00000218* (0.00000117)	0.00000211* (0.00000118)
Incidence of intrastate conflict		0.180*** (0.0494)	0.131** (0.0508)	0.112** (0.0480)	0.115** (0.0479)	0.115** (0.0479)	0.142*** (0.0498)	0.101* (0.0558)			
Religiosity			0.603*** (0.112)	0.635*** (0.106)	0.565*** (0.114)	0.565*** (0.114)	0.487*** (0.123)	0.515*** (0.128)	0.556*** (0.123)	0.548*** (0.128)	0.540*** (0.127)
Avg. Confidence in Government				0.199*** (0.0481)	0.207*** (0.0474)	0.207*** (0.0474)	0.218*** (0.0478)	0.231*** (0.0476)	0.240*** (0.0470)	0.235*** (0.0482)	0.233*** (0.0484)
Avg. Trust					-0.211* (0.124)	-0.211* (0.124)	-0.228* (0.128)	-0.235* (0.122)	-0.232* (0.126)	-0.218* (0.129)	-0.227* (0.128)
Conscription							-0.155*** (0.0410)	-0.121*** (0.0385)	-0.103*** (0.0371)	-0.105*** (0.0374)	-0.105*** (0.0375)
Trade								-0.00161*** (0.000579)	-0.00185*** (0.000584)	-0.00177*** (0.000581)	-0.00175*** (0.000586)
Incidence of International war and violence									0.0788 (0.149)		0.0774 (0.154)
Incidence of Civil war and violence										0.0632 (0.0584)	0.0628 (0.0589)
R^2	0.037	0.097	0.247	0.311	0.319	0.319	0.379	0.420	0.406	0.409	0.412
N	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156

Standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Before explaining any of these findings, let us understand how these effects change when we control for certain factors. Table 8 presents the results of multivariate regressions controlling for wave effects. We can see that the relationship for all conflict indicators, income or trust, are only either marginally significant or not significant at all, indicating that it was the correlation with other factors that were explaining the previous relationships. However, the coefficients on other factors such as trade, religiosity, confidence in government and conscription are extremely significant and are in the same direction as the correlation estimates. An interesting finding here that provides support to the analysis of individuals, is that nationalism is negatively correlated with conscription. However, it is important to note that the interpretation here is very different. In this analysis, I find that countries that have mandatory conscription are on average, less patriotic than countries that do not. This finding is interesting because it is not a natural experiment that gives light to it; we are essentially comparing average nationalism across countries controlling for other factors and wave effects. Surely, the hypothesis about people's expectations of conscription cannot play a role here. I argue that nationalism is a function of the freedom one gets in their country and the exposure to nation-building activities. As individuals are given less freedom to decide how they can spend their lives, when they can pursue further education and where they can go, they tend to love their nation less. However, when individuals are exposed to nation-building activities like conscription, propaganda, national day celebrations and compulsory singing of national anthems, they tend to feel prouder of their nation. Mandatory conscription is an event where these two effects are opposing each other. On one hand, individuals are being forced to train and fight for their country and on the other, they are being stripped of the liberty to decide how they would spend those years otherwise. Clearly, the effect of having less liberty dominates for the evidence above. In Spain, people were given back their liberty and they became more patriotic. Further, countries where men have this liberty and more patriotic than those that do not.

VII. Conclusion

Relationships between nationalism and a variety of economic, cultural and political factors are strong and significant. There is a lot of variation in nationalism both on the individual as well as the country level. Nationalism can be beneficial for a country, especially in times of war, as much of the literature has discussed. It could also be harmful and lead to economically damaging policies such as protectionism. In this paper, I make no claim about whether nationalism is beneficial or harmful but I believe that if policymakers are looking to engage in any sort of nation-building policy, then it is worth understanding what high and low levels of nationalism are associated with. Further studies could explore the reason behind why nationalism is positively related to factors like religiosity, age and political interest, and negatively related to trust and trade openness. As of now, we only know that empirically, this is the way they correlate.

Where conscription is concerned, I find that the removal of conscription, in fact, increases national pride and I argue that the mechanism is through the liberty one gets when they do not need to serve. The evidence from Spain's natural experiment is consistent with evidence from the country level data. My first hypothesis that conscription increases nationalism has turned out, in some ways to be false. As for the other hypotheses, aside from income, trust and conflict, the rest of the correlations have been confirmed by the data. Further work on this could explore why trust and conflict had a surprising correlation with national pride.

VIII. References

Ahlerup, P., & Hansson, G. (2011). Nationalism and government effectiveness. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 39(3), 431-451. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2011.05.001

Shulman, S. (2003). Exploring the economic basis of nationhood. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 9(2), 23-49. doi:10.1080/13537110412331301405

Alesina, A., & Reich, B. (2013). *Nation building*. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Posen, B. (1993). Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power. *International Security*, 18(2), 80. doi:10.2307/2539098.

Alesina, A., Reich, B., & Riboni, A., (2017). *Nation-Building, Nationalism and Wars (Working Paper)*. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Mulligan, C., & Shleifer, A. (2005). Conscriptio as Regulation. *American Law and Economics Review*, 7(1), 85-111. doi:10.3386/w10558.

Enke, B. (2018). Moral Values and Voting: Trump and Beyond. *Working Paper* doi:10.3386/w24268

Contact CIA. (2016, April 01). Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

S. (n.d.). GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved from <https://www.globalsecurity.org/>

World Development Indicators | DataBank. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>

World Value Survey. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>.

Polity IV Project. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>

Federico Trillo: «Señoras y señores, se acaba la mili». (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2001/03/09/espana/984145280.html>

UCDP- Department of Peace and Conflict Research. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/>

Military service. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_service

IX. Appendix: Detailed Data Description

Appendix 1: WVS Questions Used in Individual-Level Analysis

Question No.	Question	Variable Description
G006	How proud of nationality	4: Very Proud 3: Quite Proud 2: Not Very Proud 1: Not At All Proud
X047	Scales of Income	Levels of Income that are specific to each country. For more information, I refer readers to the WVS Questionnaire
X025	Highest education level attained	1: Inadequately completed elementary education to 8: University with degree/Higher education - upper-level tertiary certificate For full list, please refer to the WVS Codebook
X036	Profession/Job	1: Member of the armed forces 0: Not a member of the armed forces
X001	Sex	1: Male 0: Female
X003	Age	13-100
E069_11	How confident in government	4: A Great Deal 3: Quite A Lot 2: Not Very Much 1: None at All
A165	Generalized trust	1: Most people can be trusted 0: Can't be too Careful
F034	Religious person	1: A religious person 0: Not a religious person/A convinced atheist
E023	Interest in Politics	4: Very Interested 3: Quite Interested 2: Not Very Interested 1: Not at All Interested
X007	Marital Status	1: Married 0: Not Married
S002	Wave	1:1981-1984 2:1989-1993 3:1994-1998 4:1999-2004 5:2005-2009 6:2010-2014
A001	Importance of Family	4: Very Important 3: Rather Important 2: Not Very Important 1: Not at all Important
A025	Respect: Always or Earned	1: Always 0: Earned/Neither
A026	Responsibility of parents to kids	1: Parents should do their best for kids 0: Parents have a life/Neither
A124_09	Do not want as Neighbors: Homosexuals	1: Mentioned 0: Not Mentioned
F114_03	Is Violence justifiable?	1: Never to 10: Always

Appendix 2: Summary of Data Sources Used in Country-Level Analysis

Variable	Source	Description
GDP/Capita	WDI	GDP per capita at constant 2010 USD
Taxes as % of Government Revenue	WDI	Value of Compulsory transfer to central government for public purpose as a % of GDP
Trade as a % of GDP	WDI	Value of Exports and Imports as % of GDP
Avg. Trust Levels	WVS	% of people that believe "Most people can be trusted"
Avg. Confidence in Government	WVS	Mean Level of Confidence in Government
Avg. Religiosity	WVS	% of people that are religious
Democracy Index	Polity IV	Polity 2: Combined Polity Score
Incidence of Armed Warfare	UCDP	Dummy variables indicating the incidence of intrastate conflict in each country-year pair
International Violence and War	MEPV	Magnitude score of episode(s) of international violence and War involving that state in that year
Civil Violence and War	MEPV	Magnitude score of episode(s) of Civil violence and War involving that state in that year
Legal Origins	LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2008	Dummy Variables indicating the legal origins of the country
Conscription	Mulligan and Shleifer, 2005 Wikipedia www.globalsecurity.org CIA world Factbook	Dummy Variable indicating that conscription exists in that country at that time